-By Special Political Correspondent
(Lanka-e-News -20.April.2025, 11.10 PM) It was a performance worthy of theatre—albeit not the kind one expects from a man who proclaims himself a globally respected counter-terrorism expert. In a recent interview on Derana’s Hyde Park, Professor Rohan Gunaratna spun a web so intricate, so loosely tethered to fact, that even seasoned observers of Sri Lankan politics were left blinking in disbelief.
Gunaratna, who has long claimed proximity to global intelligence communities and authorship of over 30 books, appears to have taken a definitive turn into the realm of fantasy. During the interview, he confidently declared that the United Kingdom had imposed sanctions on several high-ranking Sri Lankan military officials, without any evidence. The problem? Yes- sanctions exist with hard evidences. Not one, hundreds of evidences The UK Foreign Office, ever diligent, has said- sanctions are imposed afterrefull considerations. The fallout was immediate and, for once, refreshingly symmetrical. Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, a man whose battlefield record speaks louder than any armchair theorist ever could, has now publicly invited Gunaratna to a debate. Not a discussion, not an academic colloquium—an outright debate. On stage. In public. Mano a mano.
It is a challenge that deserves acceptance if Gunaratna stands by his words. But perhaps that is precisely the problem: he may not.
In the years leading up to 2009, Rohan Gunaratna famously proclaimed that Sri Lanka’s military would not be able to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The war, he suggested, would drag on indefinitely, a stalemate mired in guerrilla conflict.
History had other plans.
Under the leadership of Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, the Sri Lankan Army did what Gunaratna said could not be done: it defeated the LTTE. Not just in theory, not through attrition, but in a decisive military campaign that shattered the group’s territorial grip and annihilated its hierarchy.
This wasn’t merely a miscalculation on Gunaratna’s part. It was a fatal blow to his credibility. For a man whose expertise is supposedly rooted in counter-terrorism strategy, failing to foresee the conditions for total victory raises questions not only about his judgment, but also about the authenticity of his self-professed expertise.
Gunaratna’s overreach doesn’t end with military strategy. In the same Hyde Park interview, he casually stated that the Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration “never cared about GDP.” This sweeping claim was, once again, factually incorrect.
During Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency, the finance portfolio was held by then-Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. His economic team—comprising seasoned professionals—regularly conducted GDP evaluations, growth forecasts, and fiscal policy adjustments. The central bank, the Department of Census and Statistics, and the Ministry of Finance all released quarterly GDP assessments.
To say the government “never cared about GDP” is akin to saying a doctor never thought about body temperature. It’s ludicrous. Either Gunaratna was grossly misinformed, or he deliberately chose hyperbole to reinforce a political narrative.
Gunaratna further waded into dangerous territory when he alleged that Asad Maulana—political aide turned whistleblower—had forged documents to gain asylum in Switzerland. It was a serious claim, presented with unnerving confidence.
Unfortunately for Gunaratna, Swiss authorities say otherwise.
Sources familiar with Maulana’s case confirm that no forged documents were presented. He submitted a witness statement and was granted political asylum. There is now talk of legal action. Maulana is reportedly consulting lawyers to sue Gunaratna for defamation—a move that may drag the professor into the kind of courtroom he is unused to, one where evidence matters more than self-promotion.
Gunaratna often introduces himself as the author of over thirty books. It is a claim that, at face value, seems impressive—until one listens to him speak.
His English, bluntly put, is rudimentary. At academic events, including one in Singapore, audience members have openly questioned his command of language. At a session hosted by an Australian university, one academic politely urged Gunaratna to “use better academic English.” In a field where nuance and clarity are vital, his delivery is awkward, often bordering on incoherent.
Whispers among intelligence circles and academic publishers suggest that much of his written work has been ghostwritten—produced by third parties and attributed to him for credibility. Whether or not this is true, the disparity between his public speaking and the language of his publications is striking, and deeply suspicious.
Another pillar of Gunaratna’s narrative collapsed when he defended former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Director Suresh Saleh, claiming Saleh had never met Zaharan Hashim, the Easter Sunday bombing mastermind, in a safe house.
That claim is now under serious scrutiny.
Phone records and location data, provided by Maulana and corroborated by another intelligence source, place Saleh in the vicinity of Zaharan during the relevant time period. The evidence is circumstantial but mounting. Even Saleh’s 37-year military service record—touted by Gunaratna as unblemished—is being re-examined. According to defence ministry sources, he has received internal warnings in the past, including one for weapon misuse.
Gunaratna’s attempt to portray Saleh as a man above reproach now appears less like analysis and more like spin.
Gunaratna’s academic resume is another matter of concern. He claims affiliations with institutions like the University of St Andrews and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Yet independent verifications reveal inconsistencies. Some of his work is not peer-reviewed. Much of it lacks proper citations. And among global intelligence professionals, Gunaratna is increasingly regarded as a figure of theatrical flourish, not academic rigor.
His claim that Milhan—a minor figure in local Islamist circles—was the “head of the military wing of ISIS Sri Lanka” was another example of reckless exaggeration. Milhan’s involvement appears to have been ideological rather than operational. The notion of a formalised ISIS military structure within Sri Lanka remains unsubstantiated.
Even Gunaratna’s supposed interview with Hadiya, Zaharan’s wife, is under question. No credible journalist or investigator has corroborated the claim. Was it conducted in person? On what date? Was it recorded? No details, no transcript, no proof.
Perhaps the most comical moment in the Hyde Park interview came when Gunaratna claimed that 337 intelligence reports had been generated prior to the Easter Sunday attacks. It is a number that has become the butt of jokes across Colombo. According to the Parliamentary Select Committee and independent analysts, most intelligence activity occurred after the bombings.
Gunaratna’s theory that every branch of Sri Lanka’s security establishment—military intelligence, army intelligence, navy intelligence, STF, police special branch—issued warnings is not only logistically implausible but factually incorrect. The reality was one of fatal communication failures, not clairvoyance.
Gunaratna also referenced Justice Imam’s report in response to Channel 4’s documentary on the Easter attacks. But this raises another curious question: who actually wrote the report?
Justice Imam, a retired Pakistani jurist, is not known for his fluency in English or his experience in investigative documentation of this nature. Some now speculate whether Gunaratna himself had a hand in drafting the report, a suspicion fuelled by the report’s language and framing.
This, too, remains unanswered.
In perhaps his most inflammatory claim, Gunaratna accused Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith of orchestrating a political coup to remove President Sirisena and bring down Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The Cardinal is now seeking legal advice. Should he proceed with litigation, Gunaratna could find himself dragged into yet another courtroom drama.
Worse still was Gunaratna’s defense of Israel’s military actions in Gaza, which he described as “justifiable,” while shifting blame onto the “innocent people in Gaza.” His remarks have sparked outrage among human rights activists, clergy, and scholars alike. They reveal a deeply troubling moral compass, one that excuses state violence while demonising victims.
Gunaratna has also attempted to pin Sri Lankan radicalisation on Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami and Saudi-funded preachers. Yet neither claim holds up under scrutiny.
There is no concrete evidence of Jamaat-e-Islami operating terror-linked networks in Sri Lanka. Likewise, Saudi-funded mosques and charities in Sri Lanka have long been monitored—and none have been linked to violent extremism.
This is classic Gunaratna: identify convenient foreign villains, overlay them with half-baked intelligence, and declare them existential threats. It is counter-terrorism analysis by caricature.
Gunaratna claimed that 32 Sri Lankans had joined ISIS in Iraq. The number, according to immigration data and international intelligence, is inaccurate.
Records show that 27 Sri Lankans travelled to Kuwait, later transiting to Iraq for short-term business ventures. None have been convicted of terrorism offences. Yet Gunaratna, never one to be encumbered by facts, continues to inflate numbers to fit a narrative of global jihad that simply does not apply.
In the end, Rohan Gunaratna is not merely a flawed analyst—he is a symptom of a larger problem. A media landscape that rewards spectacle over substance. An intelligence community that elevates compliant voices over credible ones. And a political culture that enables self-styled prophets to peddle panic under the guise of expertise.
He has become, in effect, the televangelist of terror—a man more interested in airtime than accuracy, more concerned with his own myth than the truth.
As Field Marshal Fonseka and others prepare to call his bluff in the public arena, it is perhaps time for Sri Lanka to re-evaluate who it chooses to trust in matters of national security.
Because the stakes are too high to be left in the hands of a man who cannot even conjugate his own credibility.
-By Special Political Correspondent
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by (2025-04-20 17:56:53)
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